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Chinese Affairs


EF/P Logged
IN: 1973
OUT: 1 Apr 76

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5 September 1973

State Department review completed



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The Party Congress: The Old and the Young

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On 24 August, the opening day of the Tenth Party Congress, the delegates heard two reports that touched on various aspects of the current political situation. One was Chou En-lai's political report, which wrapped up the major events since the last congress in 1969 and set forth the party's present tasks. The other was a report on the revision of the party constitution, delivered by Wang Hung-wen, the young Shanghai official who was catapulted to national prominence as one of the party's five vice chairmen. Although Wang's speech purported to address itself to the changes in the constitution, it in fact ranged further, overlapping with Chou's on some points and diverging on others. Wang's address had much more of a revolutionary fervor about it than Chou's. Chou seemed concerned mainly with protecting gains already made and with orderly, unified progress for China in the future.

Wang seemed to have more zest for political struggle than did Chou. Wang quoted Mao on the necessity and timeliness of the Cultural Revolution and stated flatly that many political movements "such as the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution" are necessary, a concept that appears in the new constitution. While Chou endorsed the line that the future will bring continual struggles within the party, he did not describe them as political movements on the scale of the Cultural Revolution. Apparently recognizing the anxiety the news of more "struggles" will cause among party officials, Chou urged them to be "fully prepared mentally" for these struggles.

Both Chou and Wang urged party officials to oppose erroneous policies—"dare to go against the tide," a phrase included in the new constitution. Chou seemed to be alluding to his own opposition to the excesses of the Cultural Revolution, however, while Wang may have had more in mind the need to oppose current policies. Chou, seemingly aware that party officials have had problems in the past in trying to determine which policies are correct at a given time, merely called on party members to "do their best in discerning" erroneous tendencies. Wang, on the other hand, insisted that those who study Mao and the other Communist philosophers will have little trouble distinguishing between correct and erroneous policies.

Wang roundly criticized party officials for failing to accept supervision by the masses, for stifling criticism, and for engaging in such "unhealthy tendencies" as influence-peddling. He called on the masses to express their views freely, write big-character posters, and hold great debates—techniques used extensively during the Cultural Revolution. Chou, on the other hand, was less severe in his criticism, merely chiding party officials for concentrating on routine and minor matters. He, too, noted "unhealthy tendencies" in the party, but did not elaborate on these and did not call on cadre to accept criticism from the masses.

Wang in general expressed great faith in the notion that constant ideological struggle within the party will keep the organization pure and that outside supervision by the masses will check any possible ideological backsliding among its members. He noted, for example, that "revisionism" is the "main danger today." He was ringing in his praise of the Cultural Revolution and viewed upheavals of that nature as a valid exercise for the future. Chou, while paying lip service to some of these notions, seemed concerned about the practical aspects of maintaining party discipline and party control, assuring the livelihood of the masses, and boosting the morale of party members. Chou made frequent reference to the need for rules and regulations, and his report was the only document released by the congress to assign to party officials the task of "concerning themselves with the well-being of the masses."

Differences between a young and an old leader seem to be illustrated in the two reports. Wang is a product of the Cultural Revolution and obviously sees merit in continued stress on revolutionary ferment; Chou had the thankless task of trying to keep the country running during that time and is acutely aware of the pitfalls. The addition of Wang to the top hierarchy suggests he is acceptable to moderates like Chou. In view of the differences between his report and Chou's, however, the party has apparently accepted the notion that there is room at the top for different opinions on specific issues.

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Pre-Convention Contentlon

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The Asian/African/Latin American table tennis tournament that opened in Peking on 25 August during the Tenth Party Congress gave spectators more to see than just ping pong matches. On 26 August, Tan Chen-lin and Ulanfu, two former vice premiers of the State Council, attended the matches. It was their first public appearance since their purge during the Cultural Revolution. Ulanfu was an alternate member of the Politburo and party boss of Inner Mongolia. Tan, a full member of the Politburo, was the regime's top agricultural administrator during a period when Peking was pursuing a relatively moderate and pragmatic course in agricultural development.

They are the first major figures to be rehabilitated since the reappearance last April of Teng Hsiao-ping, the former party secretary general. Tan's return is particularly significant in the light of Peking's continuing agricultural difficulties and the consequent need for the experience he represents. Neither man has been identified as holding a government position, but both were elected to the tenth Central Committee.

The decision to reinstate these two men probably helped stimulate the recent radical assault in the media on a number of pragmatic policies associated with Chou En-lai. During the weeks immediately preceding the congress, there were caustic comments attacking the rehabilitation of disgraced cadre. Stringent birth control regulations, moderate reforms in education, the role of experts and foreign technology in economic development, and material incentives and production bonuses in industry were assailed. Along with these attacks, some modifications have occurred in Chou's programs. For example, the material incentive program has apparently been discontinued in some factories.

Such critical propaganda, on the eve of the party congress, shows the type of opposition Chou and other moderate leaders continuously face within the leadership. The brevity of the party congress suggests that party leaders have yet to come to grips with many major issues. That task may have been left to the new Politburo.

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A Wariness About Visitors

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Several recent incidents have indicated the Chinese are becoming more sensitive about foreign visitors. During the last few months, a Chinese-American scholar was expelled, the exposed film of another visitor was confiscated, a well-known Western authority on China was detained in Shanghai, and a British correspondent and a group of American educators in separate incidents encountered difficulty while photographing posters. Peking reportedly will issue no new visas until mid-October.

These incidents may be related, at least in part, to the increased political activity that has been under way for some months in Chinese cities in connection with the Tenth Party Congress. The Chinese-American scholar, Kai-yu Hsu, who was expelled on 11 August, is the author of a highly laudatory biography of Chou En-lai, published in 1967. Two Chinese officials denounced the work, told the author he was clearly biased in favor of Chou, and said that even the book's title—"Chou En-lai: China's Grey Eminence"—implied that the Premier was more important than Mao. Hsu apparently was expelled because his presence before the congress was an embarrassment to the leadership.

Apart from this case, it is not at all clear what role, if any, domestic politics have played in such incidents. There have been occasional signs of an adverse reaction by radical elements in the leadership to some aspects of the Sino-American exchange program. This was implicit, for example, in a *People's Daily* article in mid-August that included a warning not to "wait for, rely on, or beg for outside support."

Mao's recent meetings with Chinese-American scientists amount to a personal endorsement of the exchange program, which would seem to preclude any significant tampering with it. The Chinese press, moreover, continues to publicize the visits of prominent Americans.

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THE NEW POLITBURO OF THE 10th CENTRAL COMMITTEE

SC *Mao Tse-Tung, Chairman

2	†Wang Hung-wen	Number-three man of Shanghai and the fastest rising member of China's present leadership; a Cultural Revolution activist and a probable protégé of Chang Chun-chiao, he may have moderated his once-radical political position.
	†Wei Kuo-ching	Boss of Kwangsi Province who came down hard on rampaging Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution.
SC	*Yeh Chien-ying	A military man and de facto defense minister.
	Liu Po-cheng	Retired marshal; an honorary elder.
	Chiang Ching	Mao's wife and leader of radical elements during the Cultural Revolution.
SC	*Chu Te	Retired marshal and early builder of the army; an honorary elder.
	Hsu Shih-yu	Kiangsu party boss and commander of Nanking Military Region.
	†Hua Kuo-feng	Hunan party boss now residing in Peking and active in national politics since the Cultural Revolution; little is known of his political views.
	Chi Teng-kuei	From Honan Province; rose to prominence during the Cultural Revolution.
	†Wu Teh	Peking party boss and former head of Kirin Province.
	Wang Tung-hsing	Mao's former bodyguard; director of the central office of the Central Committee.
	†Chen Yung-kuei	Boss of Tachai Commune, China's national agricultural model.
	Chen Hsi-lin	Liaoning party boss and commander of Shenyang Military Region.
	Li Hsien-nien	Finance minister and long-time associate of Chou En-lai.
	*Li Te-sheng	A military man, head of the General Political Department of People's Liberation Army, and Anhwei Province party boss.
	*Chang Chun-chiao	Party boss of Shanghai and possibly party secretary general; generally believed to be one of the more powerful members of the Politburo who may have moderated his former radical views.
	*Chou En-lai	Premier.
	Yao Wen-yuan	Number-two man in Shanghai and a prominent leader of radical forces during the Cultural Revolution.
	*Kang Sheng	Former head of the security apparatus who was criticized for radical excesses during the Cultural Revolution; believed to be in poor health.
	*Tung Pi-wu	An honorary elder who is acting President of the People's Republic of China.

Teng Hsiao-ping

ALTERNATES TO THE POLITBURO

†Wu Kuei-hsien	A female worker
†Su Chen-hua	Deputy commander of the navy
†Ni Chih-fu	A worker
†Saifudin	Head of Sinkiang Province and, as a Uighur, one of the highest ranking minority cadre in China

* Member of Standing Committee of Politburo

† New member of Politburo

Some Observations on the New Leadership

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The new leadership, endorsed last month at the Tenth Party Congress, is a mixed bag of party regulars, model workers and peasants, rehabilitated party and government officials, and military men. The new Central Committee is substantially larger than its predecessor. It consists of about 200 holdovers from the ninth Central Committee, 95 newcomers, and 20 rehabilitated officials from the eighth committee. Sixty-two members of the ninth committee were dropped.

The PLA did relatively well, given Peking's desire to reduce the military's influence in party affairs. The military reportedly was allowed to make up only one sixth of the total number of delegates to the congress, a quota that allegedly caused some grumbling in the ranks. The military won roughly 30 percent of the Central Committee seats, a cutback from the 40 percent it had on the ninth Central Committee but possibly a larger allocation than originally intended. The group even included about ten new military men. A notable absentee was Wang Hsin-ting, a deputy chief of staff who was a full member of the last committee. Wang failed to make the new group, as did the second-ranking leaders of Kwangsi and Shantung provinces, both military men. In all, 38 military men from the old committee were passed over.

The three former party leaders who were rehabilitated earlier this year were elected to the Central Committee. The list also included another veteran, Li Ching-chuan, who was not rehabilitated earlier. Several former provincial party bosses also were elected to the new committee.

Chou En-lai was successful in placing several of his trusted associates from the State Council on the Central Committee. The Foreign Ministry is especially well represented. Chiao Kuan-hua, Chou's alter-ego in the Foreign Ministry, is a newcomer to the committee, as are the premier's English language interpreter, Nancy Tang, and UN ambassador Huang Hua. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei is now in the group, correcting an unusual situation in which he had no formal party status. Liao Cheng-chih, a Japan specialist and close associate of Chou's, is back from the eighth Central Committee.

Chou did less well on the Politburo. None of the nine newcomers can be said to be his close associate. Three of Chou's associates had seemed to be in line for Politburo slots, but did not make it. Moreover, former Politburo members among the rehabilitated party officials did not regain their seats. These men were not necessarily personally associated with Chou, but the policies they espoused when they were in power were virtually identical to Chou's. While ultra-leftists Chiang Ching and Yao Wen-yuan failed to move up to the elite Standing Committee, it is worth noting that Chou's closest associate on the Politburo, Li Hsien-nien, was also passed by.

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There is no seat on the Central Committee for Pai Hsiang-kuo, a military man who has done a commendable job as foreign trade minister. Pai was not on the previous committee, but seemed a logical candidate this time around because of his prominence in government affairs and his apparently good working relationship with Chou.

Some radicals were also disappointed. Mao's supposed niece, Wang Hai-jung, is not on the committee, nor is Mao's nephew Mao Yuan-hsin, a Liaoning Province party secretary. The radical husband-and-wife team from Szechwan, Liu Chieh-ting and Chang Hsi-ting, both members of the ninth Central Committee, were dropped from the tenth. The couple, imprisoned in the 1960s by regional party chief Li Ching-chuan, enjoyed Madame Mao's support and rose to Central Committee membership after Li fell. With Li back on the Central Committee, it is not surprising that the radical duo has lost favor. Another radical casualty of the old committee is Nieh Yuan-tze, a Peking University instructor who led a radical Red Guard Group during the Cultural Revolution.

These are initial observations on the composition of the new Central Committee. They will be amplified after further analysis.

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Peking Strikes Back

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A round of intensified anti-Soviet propaganda--perhaps Peking's sharpest attack in two years--has been under way for several months. The Chinese press has carried numerous articles critical of Soviet diplomacy in Europe, the Middle East, Persian Gulf, and Japan. Soviet international economic, maritime, and strategic arms policies have all been condemned. Peking has implied widespread support for its views by carrying a healthy number of official statements and articles critical of Moscow from such disparate countries as Sierra Leone, Australia, and Nepal.

The Chinese effort picked up steam in July, clearly in response to the stiff, high-level Soviet assault that followed the Crimea conference. Last month, anti-Soviet articles appeared almost daily in Peking. The Chinese recalled the anniversary of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia for the first time in a formal commentary and in the process condemned Brezhnev by name. In one of the sharpest attacks yet, NCNA on 25 August asserted that Moscow's current policies regarding neighboring countries, Soviet republics, and non-Russian nationalities in the USSR are as aggressive, colonial, and oppressive as the policies of Czarist Russia.

Chinese commentary in the main has lacked an authoritative stamp, despite the fact that Moscow has pressed its campaign with anti-Chinese statements from Brezhnev himself and with a host of authoritative articles in *Pravda*, *Kommunist*, and the official organs of Moscow's staunch Eastern European allies. Early this month, Peking did issue a government statement critical of Moscow's nuclear policy, but it was on the occasion of China's accession to a treaty making Latin America a nuclear-free zone, and it simply reiterated long-standing Chinese themes. Moreover, Peking's propaganda lacks the edge of Moscow's; the Chinese, for instance, have developed no major new themes, nor have they belabored the Soviets on a specific bilateral issue.

The Chinese seem to have been stimulated primarily by external events; virtually all attacks are centered on Soviet foreign policy. Aside from Moscow's own propaganda campaign, the Chinese are mindful of Soviet efforts to promote a collective security scheme in Asia, a world-wide conference of Communist parties aimed at reading Peking out of the movement, and European detente, which Peking long has believed works to its disadvantage. Peking is also concerned about Soviet competition for influence in Japan and in the Persian Gulf - Indian Ocean area. Peking has been particularly critical of Soviet diplomacy in the latter regions. The highly critical 25 August article recalled Czarist Russia's aggression not only against China but also against Iran. China has made no bones about its intention to try to shoulder the Soviets aside in Iran.

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Increased Dependence on World Economy

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Agricultural difficulties over the past two years, along with a slowdown in industrial growth and a greater need for foreign technology, have prompted Peking to retreat from the Maoist ideal of self-reliance. Evidence of China's abruptly increased dependence on the world economy—notably on American granaries and on Japanese and Western high-technology industries—is found in:

- costly increases in imports of grain, cotton, and other agricultural products, from \$450 million in 1972 to an anticipated record level of \$1.2 billion in 1973; more than one half of the 1973 total will be supplied by the United States;
- a substantial expansion in investment in agriculture and supporting industries, an expansion requiring foreign plants, equipment, and technology;
- a willingness to relax the self-imposed policy of no foreign debt by incurring medium-term obligations on foreign plants;
- a drive to develop new sources of foreign exchange to help pay the mounting import bill.

Peking's greater reliance on foreign sources for food, machinery, and technology almost certainly will extend through the remainder of the current Fourth Five-Year Plan (1971-75). Agricultural production in the first eight months of 1973 has been hampered by drought in the north and floods in the south and may not greatly surpass the disappointing harvest of 1972, which was roughly five percent below 1971. Investment in the agricultural sector must be increased substantially if production is to grow two percent a year and thus keep up with the population growth rate. The modernization of industry, transportation, and the military (including steel, petroleum exploration and refining, electronics, chemicals, and machine-building) all depends on foreign technology.

China's current purchases from the US are largely agricultural products. Because of world-wide food shortages, the United States almost overnight has become China's principal supplier of agricultural products and its third leading trading partner, behind Japan and Hong Kong. In the industrial field, the United States is a latecomer to a market previously shared by Japan and the leading industrial nations of Western Europe. The US has sold communications equipment, ten Boeing 707 aircraft, and, most recently, three ammonia plants. As for technology, the Chinese will continue to rely on several non-Communist industrial nations. The United States

[redacted]

will have an advantage in high-technology branches like civil aircraft, advanced computers, communications equipment, and oil-drilling equipment. China will not enter into joint ventures with foreign firms, however, and will seek to minimize the number of foreign technical specialists on Chinese soil. Peking could readily increase its medium-term debt severalfold above the present \$200-300 million, but will move cautiously. The US share in the financing of industrial purchases will be tiny in absolute terms. The United States will share the impact of China's efforts to raise its foreign exchange earnings. Peking is trying to expand its market in the US for silk textiles, specialty foods, objets d'art, and handicrafts.

Regardless of who eventually succeeds the aging Mao and Chou, China's economic problems will pose constraints on political action. Any regime probably would be under strong pressure (a) to retain the United States as a key back-up source of food and cotton merely to maintain the spartan living standards of the vast population, (b) to look to the outside world for modern equipment and technology in order not to lag further behind international technical standards in industry and agriculture, and (c) to improve its military capabilities on the basis of foreign support in the fields of communication equipment, transport equipment, instruments, and metal alloys. The rhetoric of political controversy will continue to exhibit wider swings than actual economic policy, which generally will reflect these economic realities. Nonetheless, the history of political conflict in China casts doubt on straight-line forecasts of economic policies based on calculations of economic necessity [redacted]

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No Comment On Cambodia

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China passed up several opportunities this month to comment on significant developments in Cambodia. There has been no official endorsement, for example, of a statement by Sihanouk's exile government in mid-August regarding the US bombing halt, although a response to such statements is usually made within days. The Chinese press did carry truncated versions of official Lao and Vietnamese supporting statements, but this only underscored the absence of Chinese comment. Peking's own news accounts of the bombing halt were straightforward and brief.

In the process of heavily editing other Vietnamese and Cambodian Communist commentary, Peking has downplayed warnings against Thai or South Vietnamese intervention, criticism of the US and its Indochina policies, and the more militant positions of the Cambodian insurgents. Peking has not kept pace with its Asian Communist allies in reporting insurgent military successes; accounts of such successes actually tapered off sharply in the Chinese press after mid-August.

There have been other signs that Peking is attempting to put some distance between itself and the Cambodian insurgents. Chou En-lai did not play host at a banquet for Sihanouk when the prince returned from North Korea in mid-August, although Chou has done so in the past. There have been no indications since mid-July that Peking is urging the insurgents to negotiate. Indeed, the last authoritative Chinese statement on Cambodia—Chou En-lai's brief remarks at a banquet for a foreign visitor on 28 July—amounted to little more than a reiteration of support for Sihanouk's five-point proposal, now more than three years old.

There are several plausible explanations: Peking may believe that negotiations are unlikely at this time; policy disagreements may have sharpened among the insurgent factions, or even between them and their principal backers in Hanoi and Peking; or Peking may simply have decided to withdraw from more direct involvement for the present, leaving it up to the Cambodians and others to settle matters.

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Talks With Japan: A Small Step Forward

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Japanese and Chinese trade officials in Tokyo reached broad agreement last week on a proposed treaty of trade and commerce. The treaty will set general trade levels and cover most-favored-nation treatment, procedures for trade contacts, and related issues such as patents and trademarks. Many specific problems remain to be negotiated, and it appears doubtful that the agreement will be initiated by 29 September, the anniversary of the resumption of diplomatic relations. The delay in initiating can be traced to contradictions between Chinese demands and trade practices and Japanese procedures, which were too great to resolve during the two weeks of negotiations in Tokyo. Both countries have been chagrined by their failure to conclude any of the major commercial agreements envisaged when relations were normalized last year.

A proposed aviation agreement received primary attention over the past year, but negotiations have been stuck on the question of Japan's continuing airline connections with Taiwan. Despite Tokyo's desire to normalize commercial relations with Peking and promote further political ties, the Japanese have been unwilling to sacrifice the profitable Taiwan air link. Thus, in political terms, the air agreement remains the most important hurdle to overcome and the most significant objective to be gained.

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Keeping the Pakistanis on Board

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Chinese officials tried to put Sino-Pakistani ties on a firm anti-Soviet footing during talks with Pakistani Minister of State for Defense and Foreign Affairs Aziz Ahmed late last week in Peking. Foreign Minister Chi Peng-fei, in formal remarks at a banquet for Ahmed, indicated that Moscow's continued presence in the Indian Ocean basin jeopardized regional stability, even though the freshly concluded Indo-Pakistani agreement improved prospects for more normal relationships in the region.

In private, Peking may have renewed warnings that the new regime in Afghanistan may well be a stalking horse for Soviet expansionist ambitions and that the common Sino-Pakistani interest in curbing Soviet influence in the region should form the basis for continuing close ties. Chinese military officials took part in the talks, suggesting that military assistance was also discussed.

Peking clearly has come to see its interests in the region in terms of blunting Soviet advances, particularly in light of Soviet attempts to gain support in the Indian Ocean area for its Asian collective security scheme. As China and Pakistan consider closer relations with India in the wake of the India-Pakistan agreement, Peking clearly hopes to prevent a weakening of its alliance with Pakistan and to use that alliance against the Soviets on the subcontinent.

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Political and Diplomatic Notes

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Even Their Best Friends Didn't Know

Some of China's closest allies were unaware that Peking had held its Tenth Party Congress until it was all over. On 29 August, just prior to the announcement about the congress, an East German diplomat was at the airport when North Vietnam's Le Duan arrived in Peking and was obviously interested in any news about it. In response to Le Duan's query if there was anything new on that score, Chou merely replied, "Nothing." The Romanian and Albanian ambassadors were not told about the congress until it had ended. [REDACTED]

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* * *

Kirin Province

Yuan Po-sheng, a veteran party cadre in Kirin Province, made his first public appearance in 11 months on 16 August, attending an athletic meet in Changchun. He has been a secretary on the provincial party committee since 1959 and was criticized by the Red Guards during the Cultural Revolution, but had survived to become an alternate member of the ninth Central Committee. There is no apparent reason for his long absence from public view, but he evidently has retained full authority. At his reappearance, he was ranked fourth as before and was given both his party and government title. Moreover, he was again elected as an alternate member of the Central Committee at the Tenth Party Congress. [REDACTED]

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Annex

The Congress: Looking Beyond the Borders

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Chou En-lai's political report to the Tenth Party Congress reaffirmed in extremely strong terms the basic anti-Soviet direction of China's foreign policy after the Cultural Revolution. Chou implied that Peking intended to curb the spread of Soviet influence wherever it could: Chinese policy is in effect a containment policy aimed at Moscow. He branded the Soviets as China's chief enemy, both as the most immediate and dangerous threat to Chinese security and as Peking's foremost ideological foe. Chou urged the Chinese populace to be on guard against a surprise Soviet attack, and he called on Marxist-Leninist parties to join Peking in a struggle "to the end" against Soviet-style communist doctrine.

Chou was unreserved in his indictment of Moscow. He said the Soviet regime has restored capitalism, enforced a "fascist dictatorship," and pursued an aggressive, militaristic policy worthy of a "new Czar." Chou implied that both Lin Biao and Liu Shao-chi were Soviet agents, fully supported by Brezhnev, and that Moscow was attempting to exploit internal Chinese politics. Chou also spoke about the current Sino-Soviet polemic; in Peking's most authoritative statement to date, he attributed Moscow's campaign to an effort to curry favor with "monopoly capitalists" now involved in commercial arrangements with Moscow. He called on the USSR to withdraw its troops from Mongolia or Czechoslovakia, or to return the Kurile Islands to Japan, as a sign of good will.

Chou left scant hope for a Sino-Soviet ideological reconciliation, but he reiterated Peking's call for improved state relations and a negotiated settlement to the boundary dispute. Chou, moreover, seemed less alarmed about an imminent Soviet attack than in the report to the Ninth Party Congress in 1969.

Chou's treatment of the US was mild in contrast to his remarks regarding the USSR. It was much milder than the ninth congress political report, which termed the US "the most ferocious enemy of the people of the whole world." Chou did not comment on American military expenditures, overseas bases, or domestic problems as the 1969 political report had. Chou's report contained the first public ideological rationale for Sino-American detente. He argued that "necessary compromises between ideologically disparate countries should be distinguished from the "collusion and compromise" between the US and USSR.

Chou reiterated Peking's long-standing opposition to attempts by the US and USSR—"the world's two nuclear superpowers"—to dominate international affairs. Here again, Chou's report was easier on the US than on the Soviets, and milder than the report to the ninth congress. Chou depicted the Soviets as expanding into the

Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, and "every place their hands can reach," while he said the US has been in "decline" since the Korean War. He said nothing of American policy regarding Taiwan, Korea, and Indochina; the 1969 report had attacked Washington sharply on these issues.

To the smaller countries, Chou seemed to offer a close relationship with China as leverage against the pressures of the big powers and, he reaffirmed the Chinese policy of championing the interests of the Third World. He invited Communist and Third World countries as well as Japan and European states chafing at big power "bullying" to join China in a broad, united front aimed against the "hegemonism" of the superpowers. Chou made it clear, however, that most of the bullying originated in Moscow; unlike the 1969 report, Chou did not indicate that the US was the direct target of the "just struggles" of the Third World.

In a major turnabout from 1969 formulations, Chou stressed the contention between the US and USSR in their quest for hegemony; the ninth congress political report focused on Soviet-American collusion. Chou indicated that relaxation of tension between Moscow and Washington was passing and superficial, citing the case of both powers supporting disarmament while "expanding their armaments daily." He said that Soviet-American friction maintains the world's balance of power. In short, Chou seemed to see advantages in Soviet-US rivalry similar to those Washington sees in the Sino-Soviet dispute. Chou specifically warned that Soviet-American detente could work to Peking's disadvantage in Europe. He said that the West, through European detente, is seeking to divert the Soviet peril eastward toward China, but that Moscow is feinting eastward while aiming to expand into Western Europe.

While citing Chinese diplomatic gains since 1969, Chou hardly mentioned the ideological and revolutionary goals that the ninth congress heavily stressed. Unlike the 1969 report, Chou did not use the term "revolutionary struggle of the proletariat" and said nothing of "armed struggles" in Burma, Indonesia, or elsewhere, or of "revolutionary mass movements" in Japan and the West. Chou did reiterate Chinese support for the peaceful reunification of Korea, for the Palestinian struggle against Zionism, and for claims by Latin American countries to 200-nautical-mile territorial waters.

Chou's remarks differed in tone—although not greatly in content—from the foreign policy section of Wang Hung-wen's report on the party constitution. Wang seemed harder on the US, indicating that Peking should be alert to surprise attacks from the US as well as the USSR and charged both with posing a "subversive" threat to the party. [REDACTED]

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CHRONOLOGY

25X1	16 August	Sihanouk returns to Peking from North Korea; met by Chou En-lai. [REDACTED]	
	18 August	Dutch parliamentary group arrives in Peking; meets with Chou En-lai on 21 August. [REDACTED]	25X1
	20 August	Chiao Kuan-hua meets with Justice William O. Douglas. [REDACTED]	25X1
	21 August	China accedes to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, declaring Latin America a nuclear-free zone; accompanying government and <i>People's Daily</i> "Commentator" statements reiterate Chinese positions on nuclear weapons. [REDACTED]	25X1
		[REDACTED]	25X1
25X1	23 August	First of Boeing 707 jet aircraft purchased by Peking arrives in China. [REDACTED]	
25X1		Yeh Chien-ying meets with military delegation from North Korea. [REDACTED]	
	24-28 August	Tenth Party Congress held in Peking. [REDACTED]	25X1
	25 August	Madame Binh stops over in Peking en route to Algiers nonaligned conference; met by Hsu Nien-lung. [REDACTED]	25X1
		Asian/African/Latin American table tennis tournament opens in Peking with 86 nations represented; ceremonies attended by Chou En-lai, Yeh Chien-ying, Chiang Ching, Chang Chun-chiao, Yao Wen-yuan, Li Hsien-nien, Chi Teng-kuei, Li Te-sheng, Wang Tung-hsing, and Sihanouk. [REDACTED]	25X1
	26 August	Rehabilitation of Tan Chen-lin and Ulanfu disclosed. [REDACTED]	25X1
	28 August	Chinese delegates walk out of meeting of regional committee of WHO to protest seating of delegation from Phnom Penh. [REDACTED]	25X1
	29 August	Peking releases communique on Tenth Party Congress and list of new Central Committee. [REDACTED]	25X1

[REDACTED]
Approved For Release 2004/11/03 : CIA-RDP85T00875R000700020015-3

29-31 August North Vietnamese First Secretary Le Duan stops over in Peking en route to Hanoi after six weeks in USSR; meets with Chou En-lai and Sihanouk. [REDACTED]

25X1

30 August First plenary session of new Central Committee elects new Politburo. [REDACTED]

25X1

31 August Peking releases text of Chou En-lai's political report to the congress. [REDACTED]

25X1

1 September Peking releases text of Wang Hung-wen's speech on the revision of the party constitution and the text of the new constitution. [REDACTED]

25X1